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In October 2020, the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia Uni-
versity convened a virtual symposium, titled “Data and Democracy,” to 
investigate how technological advances relating to the collection, anal-
ysis, and manipulation of data are affecting democratic processes, and 
how the law must adapt to ensure the conditions for self-government. This 
symposium was organized by the Institute’s 2019-2020 Senior Visiting 
Research Scholar, Yale Law Professor Amy Kapczynski, and co-sponsored 
by the Law and Political Economy Project at Yale Law School.
The essays in this series were originally presented and discussed at this 
two-day event. Written by scholars and experts in law, computer science, 
information studies, political science, and other disciplines, the essays 
focus on three areas that are both central to democratic governance and 
directly affected by advancing technologies and ever-increasing data 
collection: 1) public opinion formation and access to information; 2) the 
formation and exercise of public power; and 3) the political economy of 
data. 
The symposium was conceptualized by Knight Institute staff, including 
Jameel Jaffer, Executive Director; Katy Glenn Bass, Research Director; 
Amy Kapczynski, Senior Visiting Research Scholar; Alex Abdo, Litigation 
Director; and Larry Siems, Chief of Staff. The essay series was edited by 
Glenn Bass with additional support from Lorraine Kenny, Communi-
cations Director; A. Adam Glenn, Writer/Editor; and Madeline Wood, 
Communications and Research Coordinator. 
The full series is available at knightcolumbia.org/research/
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INTRODUCTION
Artificial intelligence has a serious transparency problem. AI is transforming governance, but its outcomes are difficult to explain, and its processes impossible for lay users to understand.1 What’s 
more, the AI tools governments increasingly rely upon to automate decision 
making are often procured from private sector vendors, compounding the 
public’s inability to ascertain what it is, exactly, that government is doing 
when it uses AI. Together, these two features have led scholars to critically 
assess the transparency and accountability of AI tools and techniques, and to 
try to improve AI’s design and performance to satisfy these essential values.2
Yet there is little consensus on what algorithmic transparency actually 
means. In a technical sense, experts have described AI’s machinations and 
determinations as “opaque” because they are difficult to explain or to artic-
ulate, even to experts.3 But even systems that are technically transparent can 
remain opaque in a legal and political sense. Automated decision systems are 
often procured in secret or with limited public oversight. Open-government 
obligations like the Freedom of Information Act and state public records 
laws do not directly reach the private sector vendors that supply AI/ML tech-
nology to the government. Today, private companies hold a near-monopoly 
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on critical information about the ethical, legal, political, and technological 
ramifications of AI, with few concomitant responsibilities to release it to 
the public.4 
Government and public institutions’ use of automation thus fosters 
opacity on two basic levels: the technical and the political-economic. At least 
in theory, innovation can address—to a greater or lesser extent—technical 
barriers to transparency.5 But the central role that law affords the private 
sector in developing and implementing AI in government bears equal respon-
sibility for opacity as does technical sophistication.
Insulating private vendors from scrutiny produces negative conse-
quences for democracy. We need to know what automated decision systems 
governments are using, how they work, and what their effects on individuals 
and society are. Without some baseline level of public-facing transparency, 
democratic principles of control and participation become elusive. But at 
precisely the same moment at which calls for algorithmic transparency and 
accountability are reaching a fever pitch, we have contracted out substantial 
portions of public governance to a virtually unregulated industry that oper-
ates largely in the shadows. This industry itself wields substantial influence 
in crafting arguments about the rightful scope and extent of transparency 
obligations, and the gaming, secrecy, and commercial interests on the other 
side of the balance.
This essay begins to sketch an agenda for rendering this private control 
transparent and accountable to the public. I argue for direct and meaningful 
algorithmic transparency obligations to be imposed upon private vendors 
that supply AI tools to government actors. I highlight the importance of 
grounding those obligations in principles of direct participation and com-
munity control in governance, rather than in elite and technocratic modes of 
oversight.6 In so doing, the essay adds to a body of work that considers how 
technology companies function as participants in our governance arrange-
ments.7 It also contributes to a long-standing conversation about whether 
and how to extend public law obligations to private actors.8
After briefly outlining the conceptual underpinnings of the freedom of 
information regime and its theoretical relationship to democratic participa-
tion and accountability, Part I maps out current approaches to algorithmic 
transparency in government. I show that, in the context of government’s use 
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of algorithms, open government falls short of its goals to promote informa-
tion-sharing or good governance. Partly in response to these shortcomings, 
efforts to promote transparency in AI have shifted from a focus on disclos-
ing the source code and data for AI tools to a focus on broader concepts of 
accountability and the right to an explanation. Core concepts of “account-
ability” and “transparency” familiar from open-government contexts are 
being contested, reimagined, and redefined. These methods of promoting 
algorithmic transparency—while essential—are not substitutes for trans-
parency law itself, because they fail to extend the participatory democratic 
values that animated the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
Part II examines how the high stakes of automated decision making 
in criminal law enforcement—and the increasingly urgent calls for direct 
democratic participation—illustrate the limits of a technocratic approach 
to algorithmic accountability and transparency. When lives are on the line, 
demands that the affected individuals and communities should be given a 
meaningful voice in policy increase. In these contexts, assurances of fairness, 
accountability, and justice from private sector vendors are widespread, but 
simply not sufficient to persuade the public or assuage concerns. In response, 
new ex ante modes of accountability are emerging to guard against abuses 
and to bolster community participation and input.
Part III concludes with three proposals for how states and governments 
could enhance algorithmic transparency. In particular, governments can 
extend public values to private vendors through contracting and procure-
ment reform. These proposals would allow government agencies to consider 
vendors’ commitments to openness in the contracting process, alongside 
the dollar figure of their bids. They would also allow government agencies 
to begin a more aggressive push toward openness in automated decision 
making by conditioning contracts on data-sharing obligations. While these 
approaches have several drawbacks, their benefits include a fidelity to the 
presumption of democratic participation and democratization of data that 
underlies the open-government framework.
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I. TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
IN A CHANGING WORLD
Transparency law’s democratic roots
Transparency has long been an integral aspect of administrative account-
ability. When Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act in 1966, it 
intended to “pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency 
action to the light of public scrutiny.”9 FOIA was a direct legislative response 
to an administrative state that had become increasingly shadowy.10 While 
FOIA has come to occupy a central role in scholarly thinking about transpar-
ency law, all 50 states have also enacted their own public records statutes, 
many of which are patterned after FOIA.11
In brief, FOIA and its state equivalents impose a general rule that govern-
ment records ought to be open to the public.12 Instead of designating certain 
categories of records as public, FOIA exhibited a presumption of disclosure 
upon request, subject to certain exemptions that were to be construed nar-
rowly.13 Those exemptions include carve outs for properly classified infor-
mation, records subject to statutory secrecy requirements, trade secrets, 
privileged information, personnel and medical files, and records compiled 
for law enforcement purposes.14
FOIA differed from other transparency obligations imposed by the regu-
latory state—its transparency mandate was oriented toward the public. While 
a wide variety of regulatory frameworks require private industry to disclose 
information to regulators, FOIA requires the government to disclose informa-
tion to anyone who asks. As Margaret Kwoka has shown, FOIA was “designed 
by journalists, for journalists,” in keeping with theories of democracy that 
placed the press at the center of democratic self-governance.15 Other disclo-
sure obligations operate quite differently. Regulatory monitors, for instance, 
can compel firms to disclose information to government agencies, even apart 
from any specific investigation of a firm.16 These disclosure arrangements are 
essential to the promotion of effective administrative oversight and expert 
regulation. But unlike FOIA, these other disclosure arrangements were never 
intended to promote effective public participation in democratic governance.
In several ways, FOIA and its state equivalents fall short of the goals 
of promoting democratic self-governance and government accountability. 
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First, FOIA left private industry largely beyond the reach of its disclosure 
obligations—and private power thus mostly undisturbed.17 The statute’s 
inadequate ability to reach private enterprise has dismayed observers at least 
since the early 2000s, particularly in the context of increasingly privatized 
military and security functions.18 Amid widespread contracting-out by gov-
ernment, the divergence between the extensive transparency obligations 
borne by government agencies and the minimal ones incurred by private 
enterprise has resulted in a growing blind spot that at times undermines 
FOIA’s chief objectives.19 A large body of literature has raised significant 
questions about how privatization might deleteriously affect public values 
such as accountability and transparency.20 The most direct and obvious 
transparency obstacle is imposed by FOIA’s failure to reach much important 
information that is either shared by or remains in the hands of the private 
sector. For instance, in 2003, when seven crew members aboard the space 
shuttle Columbia died as their vessel disintegrated upon re-entering the 
atmosphere, NASA fielded dozens of FOIA requests related to the disaster.21 
But the records held by United Space Alliance—a joint enterprise of Boeing 
and Lockheed Martin that was the contractor with major responsibility 
for the shuttle—were off-limits because they were in the hands of a private 
contractor.22
Second, and relatedly, critics of FOIA and of the “open government” 
movement more generally have also observed that the statute’s presumption 
of radical openness might exacerbate antagonism between the public and 
government institutions, inculcating suspicion and undermining trust. By 
exposing governmental wrongdoing to public scrutiny, FOIA’s structure 
systematically contributes to a “mounting adversarialism” between gov-
ernment and citizens.23 
To some degree, adversarialism can be a positive. Some amount is to 
be expected when many constituencies come to the policymaking table; 
indeed, adversarialism might be a critical aspect of “democratic contestation 
and control.”24 Yet to the extent that transparency mechanisms reveal and 
contribute to the publicity surrounding government wrongdoing, they also 
focus attention and distrust on government rather than on private actors 
who are systematically insulated from public view, amplifying the sense that 
government alone deserves that level of scrutiny and distrust.25
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Finally, FOIA’s demands themselves are exceptionally burdensome, 
and the benefits of open government are unevenly distributed. Instead of 
restricting disclosure of government information to those who had “good 
cause” to want it, FOIA required disclosure to “any person” who requested 
the records.26 FOIA’s “entitlement” to public information has led critics to 
argue that its benefits are systemically “rationed” through the litigation 
process—a process that, itself, favors wealthy private actors.27 While FOIA’s 
policy of disclosure to “any person” has historically been justified on the 
grounds that it facilitates democratic participation in government, today 
commercial enterprise represents an “overwhelming majority” of FOIA 
requests, calling this justification into doubt.28 At the state and local level, 
these dynamics are even more pronounced.29
Algorithmic transparency and accountability
Despite these flaws, public records laws have seemed a potentially fruitful 
mechanism for gathering information about government institutions’ uses of 
automation and AI.30  On one level, using public records laws to obtain access 
to the instruments of algorithmic governance is appealingly straightforward: 
Access to source code is often necessary to understand how an algorithm 
works, and source code can be accessible in written form as a record subject 
to disclosure. And in at least one recent case, public interest litigants have 
succeeded in using FOIA as a mechanism to gain access to a government 
algorithm, a computer model that the Environmental Protection Agency 
used to set policy regarding greenhouse gas emissions.31 
In other ways, however, public records statutes are proving of limited 
use to advocates seeking to better understand the government’s use of AI. 
Machine learning exemplifies trends toward privatization in government: 
One recent study of federal agencies’ adoption of AI found that nearly half 
of the 157 use cases were provided through acquisitions from commercial 
vendors or partnerships between government and private enterprise.32 Efforts 
to apply FOIA’s disclosure obligations directly to source code and analogous 
records at the core of algorithmic governance confront head-on the patholo-
gies of a system in which the private sector benefits from FOIA’s entitlements 
while entirely avoiding its obligations.33
The law insulates the private sector from scrutiny in several respects. 
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First, FOIA only applies to records that an agency “controls.”34 This “control” 
requirement has often been interpreted to mean that technologies licensed 
to the government are beyond FOIA’s reach.35 In many cases, the vendor 
of an algorithmic system that is licensed to the government will continue 
to “control” the source code for the tool, leaving it outside of FOIA’s reach. 
In agreements with vendors, governments also sometimes promise not to 
treat algorithmic tools like ordinary public records.36 Nor do governments 
always control the training or input data that affect how machine-learning 
algorithms learn over time or generate their outputs.37
Second, even when an agency unambiguously “controls” a software 
system or data, regulated industries and private sector vendors have often 
succeeded in shielding business information from public disclosure, arguing 
that it constitutes trade secrets or confidential commercial information.38 
FOIA’s Exemption 4 provides that the statute does not apply to “trade secrets 
and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and priv-
ileged or confidential.”39 The technology industry has resisted calls for 
algorithmic transparency, arguing that source code can be a highly pro-
tected trade secret.40 Vendors also often argue that that data itself is propri-
etary.41 The breadth of FOIA’s protections for trade secrets and confidential 
business information is currently uncertain.  On the one hand, the FOIA 
Improvement Act of 2016 amended FOIA to require that an agency may only 
withhold records when it “reasonably foresees” that release would cause 
harm, appearing to limit agencies’ ability to withhold documents. On the 
other hand, a 2019 Supreme Court case, FMI v. Argus Leader, expanded the 
interpretation of the “confidential business information” exemption, fueling 
efforts to conceal private sector information.42 
To be sure, expansive assertions of trade secrecy and confidentiality 
also impede transparency outside of the context of open government. When 
litigants have sought information about algorithms procured from private 
vendors to vindicate, for example, due process rights, vendors have asserted 
that the algorithms are trade secrets.43 And in recent trade deals, Silicon 
Valley has successfully lobbied for provisions that prevent source-code 
disclosure.44 Concerns about trade secrecy have motivated scholars to try 
to strike a pragmatic balance between disclosure obligations and legitimate 
commercial interests.45
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FOIA’s very design may have aggravated resistance to its use as a mech-
anism for understanding algorithmic governance. FOIA’s widespread use 
by commercial entities as a form of business intelligence-gathering, and its 
policy of disclosure to any requester regardless of need, have likely contrib-
uted to aggressive efforts to maintain trade secrecy. Because FOIA requires 
public information to be made available to anyone on request, the potential 
costs of disclosure are high and incentivize firms to try to avoid it.
And because algorithmic systems—and the contexts in which they are 
used—are complex, the value of public disclosure is not always apparent. 
Many scholars of algorithmic accountability view FOIA-style public disclo-
sure mandates as “naïve” at best and occasionally outright pernicious.46 
If a key problem with AI/ML systems is that they are too complex to be 
understood, the value of public disclosure is limited. Even sharp critics 
of algorithmic governance have evinced skepticism about transparency 
values. From a critical perspective, the idea of algorithmic transparency 
isn’t just unattainable or unrealistic, but can actually serve as a dangerous 
distraction from broader accountability deficits, laden with “unexamined 
assumptions about the benefits of transparency, equating the ability to see 
inside a system with the power to govern it.”47 As Mike Ananny and Kate 
Crawford have argued, “transparency alone cannot create accountable sys-
tems”—attention must be paid to the political and social contexts in which 
technical systems operate.48
From transparency to accountability
Perhaps driven in part by FOIA’s perceived failings, new approaches to 
“algorithmic transparency” are surfacing that prioritize technical solutions 
to opacity. At the same time as technology companies resist open-govern-
ment, disclosure-based models of transparency, they have embraced a rich 
parallel debate about how to make AI technically transparent.49 This debate 
is important: It holds the potential to improve the way AI tools work, and the 
way that they are perceived by their subjects and users. At the same time, the 
framing of algorithmic transparency risks marginalizing the value of public 
disclosure to participatory governance and democratic accountability.
Not surprisingly, the most aggressive reframing of transparency 
norms comes from industry. Technology vendors frame accountability and 
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transparency as values best achieved through technology and the private 
sector itself rather than social, political, or legal principles that involve 
obligations toward the broader public. From the private sector’s perspec-
tive, algorithmic transparency is a laudable goal that plays to companies’ 
strengths: The private sector not only occupies a central role in making 
“transparency” technically achievable, but also in interpreting its core 
meaning.50 Nor does the tech sector seriously address the potential clash 
between transparency values and its own interests in maintaining secrecy 
and confidentiality. Indeed, technology companies have successfully fought 
for provisions in trade agreements that broadly protect “source code” and 
“algorithms” from disclosure, even as they promise consumers that they 
will work to advance transparency, accountability, and trust.51  This Janus-
faced approach has garnered appropriate skepticism. As tech companies and 
interest groups hire new ethics officers and adopt new ethics guidelines to 
advance transparency and accountability, others have wondered whether 
the moves are just window dressing.52 When it comes to accountability and 
transparency, many industry promises are so vague as to be meaningless.53
Private sector influence has thus yielded deeper and less obvious prob-
lems for transparency values beyond resistance to FOIA-style disclosure 
mandates. While FOIA does not extend to private contractors or vendors, 
a growing appetite for transparency and accountability has led the tech-
nology sector to repurpose these terms with a competing set of definitions. 
Unsurprisingly, this framing advances a different set of values than FOIA’s 
emphasis on public participation and democratic self-governance.
Even outside of industry, technical approaches to algorithmic transpar-
ency have also adopted a narrower compass, avoiding implications for dem-
ocratic governance. In particular, technical approaches to “explainability” 
and “algorithmic accountability” largely focus on the question of how AI can 
provide certain key information about how it functions, rather than the ques-
tion of what kinds of public information democratic governance requires.54
Indeed, some accountability advocates have turned their noses up at 
public disclosure obligations, arguing instead for more limited, alternative 
“transparency” mechanisms.55 In one influential article, several authors 
pushed back against the idea that transparency can be a remotely realistic 
or effective mechanism for promoting accountability.56 Instead, Kroll et 
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al. suggest that “accountability” means determining why a feature is neces-
sary and explaining how its use satisfies policy goals.57
This narrower version of accountability keeps significant discretion in 
the hands of algorithm developers who can satisfy “accountability” demands 
by explaining their procedures without jeopardizing trade secrecy or calling 
into question their other commercial interests. Having defined “accountabil-
ity” in this way, it follows that a range of options for promoting transparency 
and accountability—in particular, disclosure—are off the table, namely 
because they don’t serve this particular kind of accountability-as-verifiabil-
ity. In fact, this account seems to suggest that significant secrecy can attend 
algorithmic decision making, so long as the subjects of decisions can be 
adequately reassured that the rules were followed.58 Strikingly, this version 
of accountability says nothing about how to achieve democratic oversight or 
public participation, or otherwise guarantee that an algorithm is ultimately 
“accountable“ to the public.59 The problem, then, is not simply that the pri-
vate sector does not want to disclose information about AI to the public, but 
that the public is notably absent from much of this robust discussion about 
how best to design and implement algorithmic accountability or transpar-
ency from a technical perspective. 
Instead, new ideas about algorithmic accountability and transparency 
focus nearly exclusively on how technology providers can ensure that their 
products don’t violate individual rights. An important related literature 
explores how individuals might be able to challenge algorithmic decisions 
that affect them, increasingly seeking “explainability” for the outcomes of 
automated decisions.60 The so-called “right to explanation” focuses on an 
individual right to have the outcome of an algorithmic process explained in 
an intelligible way. In theory, at least, such a right can be vindicated without 
jeopardizing trade secret or other proprietary interests—a perfect balancing 
of the vendor’s commercial interest against the data subject’s dignitary one.61
Advocates of “explainability” have thus successfully expanded the proj-
ect of algorithmic transparency and accountability beyond mere technical 
transparency. Inadvertently, however, in so doing they have reframed the 
project of algorithmic accountability as being primarily about individual 
rights.62 As Margot Kaminski has noted, several of the most compelling 
approaches to algorithmic accountability combine the individual rights 
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approach with a more systemic approach to AI governance.63 Increasingly, 
scholars are beginning to explicitly consider the role of administrative over-
sight and public governance in algorithmic accountability.64 Meanwhile, oth-
ers continued to highlight transparency as a sometimes useful mechanism 
for ensuring accountability.65 Still others have adopted more of a political 
conception of accountability.66
Whatever FOIA’s drawbacks at facilitating democratic participation—
and as articulated above, there are many—these private sector norms of 
accountability and transparency are even worse. Instead of positioning 
transparency as a tool of democratic participation, transparency is a mini-
mal obligation to ensure that individuals know how and when decisions are 
made about them. Instead of seeing transparency as a right that effectuates a 
mechanism for checking institutional malfeasance and power, transparent 
AI is a promise that only powerful institutions are in a position to make.67
 II. TRANSPARENCY IN HIGH-STAKES SETTINGS
In high-stakes settings with lives and livelihoods on the line, promises to use technology in ways that are “transparent” and “account-able” just don’t hold up. Consider how, in 2007, Indiana privatized and 
automated its system for applying for welfare benefits, resulting in more 
than a million denials—many erroneous.68 Or how, in 2013, the Michigan 
Unemployment Insurance Agency asked third-party technology companies 
to automate the state’s application for unemployment benefits. When the 
automation malfunctioned, tens of thousands of people were wrongfully 
accused of fraud, and many had their wages garnished or civil penalties 
imposed.69 Or how, in 2015, the West Virginia Department of Health and 
Human Services relied on a proprietary algorithm to slash critical Medicaid 
benefits, leaving disabled adults across the state without vital home-based 
care and, instead, institutionalized in care facilities or group homes.70
In circumstances like these, democracy demands more than promises 
of explainability and ethical behavior. In order to make informed decisions 
about governance today, the public needs much more information about how 
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these technologies operate. Instead, however, that information remains in 
private hands, often as the result of efforts to conceal key information from 
public view.
Nowhere is that dynamic more evident than in the context of criminal 
law enforcement, where automated decision making comes with particularly 
high stakes.71 Algorithms and artificial intelligence are transforming polic-
ing, enabling law enforcement to cheaply and easily use facial recognition, 
gait recognition, license plate readers, gang databases, social media surveil-
lance, predictive policing, and a range of other data-rich tools and methods. 
Algorithms are also transforming pretrial release, sentencing, and parole 
hearings.72 And proprietary software is increasingly used in generating 
evidence used against defendants at trial.73
It is tempting to think of criminal law enforcement algorithms as the 
quintessential example of “public” algorithms. But the sizable footprint of 
private vendors in this sector has posed serious obstacles to efforts to make 
policing more transparent and more accountable, as Elizabeth Joh has not-
ed.74 For instance, law enforcement has obtained predictive policing algo-
rithms from vendors such as Palantir, the shadowy surveillance company 
that supplies technology to federal, state, and local governments. When 
activists and advocates have sought information about these technologies, 
agencies have sometimes claimed that releasing audits, test results, and 
other information would violate nondisclosure agreements and jeopardize 
trade secrets.75 Similarly, private vendors have invoked trade secrecy to 
justify withholding the source code of a risk assessment used to sentence 
an individual to prison.76
As widespread resistance to racist police violence and repression contin-
ues to sweep the nation, police technologies such as facial recognition, predictive 
policing, and other surveillance technologies are coming under sustained scru-
tiny. Consider, for example, efforts to shed light on facial recognition and other 
surveillance mechanisms. Facial recognition is a form of biometric surveillance 
that identifies distinctive aspects of an individual’s facial structure and screens 
those characteristics against a database of photographs. A majority of states 
use facial recognition within their departments of motor vehicles, and 26 states 
permit law enforcement to screen photographs of potential criminal suspects 
against their DMV’s database of drivers’ license photos.77
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One major concern about facial recognition involves the potential for 
racial and gender bias.78 A recent National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology (NIST) study examining the accuracy of facial recognition software 
in identifying people of varied sex, age, and racial background found that 
the software demonstrated higher false positive rates—the frequency of mis-
identifying a face as a match—for Black and Asian faces than white faces.79 
Facial recognition technology also performs less accurately for “female” 
faces than for “male” faces, and poorer still for dark-skinned female faces.80
A significant portion of advocacy on facial recognition has centered on 
the role of private contractors, among which Amazon, owner and operator 
of the Ring Video Doorbell surveillance system, is perhaps the most visible.81 
While the company sells its doorbell cameras directly to consumers, Ama-
zon also partners with hundreds of law enforcement agencies around the 
country to share access to the footage and to encourage more widespread 
consumer adoption.82 Amazon is also reportedly considering how to build 
facial recognition into its Ring systems.83
Advocates have likely grown concerned about Clearview AI, a company 
that uses a facial recognition algorithm to cross-reference a photo of an 
individual against a library of images scraped from social media sites such 
as Facebook and Twitter.84 In early 2020, Kashmir Hill reported that over 
600 law enforcement agencies had begun using Clearview, often without 
publicly disclosing it. While Clearview later announced it would stop pro-
viding the technology to private enterprise, it has continued to supply it to 
law enforcement agencies.85 Other vendors have proven more susceptible to 
public backlash, announcing a moratorium on the sale of facial recognition 
technology to law enforcement.86
Efforts to make policing technologies transparent and accountable to the 
public do not stop at technocratic transparency, but rather force information 
into the open as part of a strategy to democratize law enforcement, radically 
shrink its footprint in American cities, and create community-led alterna-
tives.87 Strategically, activists eager to reform criminal law enforcement 
and reduce its footprint on American life have simultaneously harnessed 
the existing framework of open government and recognized its limitations, 
pushing for new and different forms of transparency and accountability. 
While private vendors themselves are beyond the reach of FOIA or its state 
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equivalents, freedom of information laws have proven essential in unveiling 
the relationships between vendors and agencies, and in stimulating public 
debate. Activists have focused a substantial amount of energy on bringing 
secretive police technologies into the public eye, subjecting them to public 
oversight, and questioning the legal structures that enable algorithmic 
policing to thrive.
Access to information is essential to be able to evaluate the potential 
value—and costs—of automated decision making in the context of criminal 
law enforcement. As Bennett Capers has suggested, new technologies of 
policing, and widespread surveillance in particular, may actually reduce 
the kinds of racial inequality and profiling to which the Supreme Court has 
historically turned a blind eye.88 And Andrew Ferguson has described how 
broad systems of predictive policing might also be used to glean critical infor-
mation to hold police accountable—what he calls “blue data.”89 This guarded 
optimism about the potential value of algorithmic criminal law enforcement 
comes with a giant caveat: It only holds if the technologies of policing them-
selves do not exhibit “implicit biases” or “suffer from unconscious racism.”90 
Indeed, critics of these law enforcement tools see them as nothing more than 
a way to cast racist policing practices in an “objective” light.91
The integral role of technology in expanding and bolstering law enforce-
ment power underscores the limitations of a technocratic form of algorithmic 
transparency. Even carefully crafted algorithmic accountability regimes are 
unlikely to resolve deep-rooted concerns about whether facial recognition 
algorithms are truly just or fair. The remedy that the subjects of algorithmic 
policing want is usually not going to be an “explanation” of a decision, an 
articulation of the general rule, or the disclosure of a data set. They want 
the decision not to take place at all.92 To put it another way, democracy 
requires us not only to ensure that AI systems are accountable, transparent, 
explainable, ethical, and all the rest, but also to ensure that the public gets 
to determine whether they are used—and how to govern them.93
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III. TOWARD A NEW 
ALGORITHMIC TRANSPARENCY
Even as private technology vendors play an increasingly rele-vant and important role in public governance, our open-government frameworks permit them to operate without public scrutiny. Partly 
because of this transparency gap, ideals of transparency and accountabil-
ity for algorithms are being reimagined by scholars and the private sector 
alike. While these contributions are important and significant, they share 
one major shortcoming: They fail to fully acknowledge, and therefore to 
adequately protect, values of democratic participation and public gover-
nance. Practically speaking, freedom of information laws share the same 
shortcomings, failing to vindicate their promise of participatory governance.
The result is a serious accountability deficit. The law must adapt to the 
challenges that automated decision making poses to public transparency 
and accountability. But rather than deferring to private authority or technical 
measures of transparency, the law should protect structures of account-
ability that make real the promise of public participation and democratic 
accountability.
The project of democratizing algorithms will require a renewed commit-
ment to public oversight structures and democratic participation. We should 
reaffirm the values that underpin transparency law itself—self-governance, 
improving government through oversight, and free expression—as sources 
of renewed democratic control. These principles point to a possible under-
standing of the kinds of information about automated decision-making 
systems that we might require be disclosed to the public.94
For now, one concrete change would make a significant difference: the 
procurement and use of proprietary algorithmic decision-making technologies 
in government should be brought under democratic control. It might seem some-
what ironic to reappropriate the legal frameworks of the outsourcing process in 
order to bring the rule of law to bear on automated decision making.95 But agen-
cies, as contracting entities, are in a position to demand and enforce contractual 
terms in the public interest in concrete ways.96 In light of the shrinking public 
role in governing algorithms, reaffirming that public agencies ultimately set the 
agenda for automated decision making is a significant step forward.
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What does that look like? Successful efforts to impose ex ante oversight 
and control of police technologies are growing in number. Laws requiring 
legislative approval for the acquisition of any new surveillance technology 
and for the publication of impact assessments and policies on surveillance 
use have been enacted in Nashville, Tennessee; Seattle, Washington; and 
Cambridge, Massachusetts.97 The ACLU has drafted a model bill for ex ante 
oversight of surveillance technology intended for widespread adoption.98 
Naturally, these efforts have, on occasion, met with significant resistance 
from law enforcement agencies.99 In the present moment, however, they 
seem to be growing in number and in volume.
One recent victory deserves particular mention. In April 2020, Washing-
ton enacted a statute that forbids government agencies to “develop, procure 
or use” facial recognition technology without first preparing a detailed 
“accountability report”—which must be subject to public review and com-
ment, including at least three community meetings, before being finalized.100 
In theory, at least, the ex ante notice and comment framework set forth in 
Washington’s law will provide ample opportunity for the public to weigh in 
on potential issues with bias, accuracy, and trade secrecy for facial recogni-
tion software. In this respect, the statute parallels algorithmic impact assess-
ments, which provide an opportunity for agencies to “engage the public and 
proactively identify concerns, establish expectations, and draw on expertise 
and understanding from relevant stakeholders.”101 This approach may not 
be perfect. Without reform to procurement rules and practices, which allow 
vendors to hide behind a veil of trade secrecy, there is no guarantee that an 
“impact assessment” will tell us anything meaningful about a technology, 
nor that it won’t be co-opted by the vendors it seeks to expose.102 Compared, 
however, with relatively meaningless assurances from the technology sector, 
this is an improvement.
At a bare minimum, statutes should limit agencies’ ability to enter into 
vendor contracts that purport to circumvent open records obligations. As a 
matter of public policy—and as a matter of transparency law—the prevalent 
practice of contracting for secrecy is questionable at best.103 Recent legisla-
tion shows forward progress on this ground: In September 2019, Rep. Mark 
Takano introduced the Justice in Forensic Algorithms Act, which would 
amend the Federal Rules of Evidence to bar using the trade secret privilege 
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alone to prevent disclosure of evidence to criminal defendants. A similar 
statute enacted in 2019 in Idaho requires pretrial risk assessment algorithms 
to be “transparent,” and specifies that “no builder or user of a pretrial risk 
assessment algorithm may assert trade secret or other protections in order 
to quash discovery in a criminal matter by a party to a criminal case.”104
While the focus on criminal law enforcement algorithms is understand-
able and commendable, these initiatives do not go far enough. For one thing, 
they do not even begin to address facial recognition, predictive policing, 
license plate readers, or the myriad other technologies in daily use in Amer-
ican police departments. A more cross-cutting strategy is justifiable.
Rather than addressing trade secrecy on a piecemeal basis, reforms 
to procurement policy could disfavor trade secrecy for proprietary tools 
of automated decision making more broadly. As advocates at AI Now have 
suggested, states and municipalities could reform the law of government 
contracts to account for other social interests beyond low bids.105 Rather 
than simply accepting the lowest bidder, contracting entities could consider 
adherence to other important values, including openness. For instance, pro-
curement law could be amended to provide that a contracting government 
entity must consider whether a bidder relies on trade secrecy to shield its 
algorithms from public disclosure. In many states, consideration of these 
values would require a change to the state’s procurement law.106
Contracting entities, in considering vendors’ claims to openness,  should 
take into account both outright invocations of trade secrecy and proposals to 
circumvent government transparency obligations. But government contracts 
should also encourage vendors to commit to other kinds of open standards, 
and in particular those developed through rigorous, public, multi-stake-
holder processes. This strategy could borrow from the federal government’s 
source-code policy (FSCP), which seeks to achieve “efficiency, transparency, 
and innovation through reusable and open source software.”107 The FSCP 
was intended to constrain federal agencies’ acquisition of custom-devel-
oped computer code when a viable existing federal or commercial solution 
provides an alternative. Notably, the FSCP also articulates a preference for 
publicly developed code and instructs agencies to “consider utilizing open 
standards whenever practicable in order to increase the interoperability of 
all Government software solutions.”108
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Open standards for artificial intelligence are still nascent. In 2019, an 
executive order, “Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence” 
(EO 13859),  instructed NIST to prioritize federal engagement in the devel-
opment of AI standards. NIST’s role as a venerable standards organization 
bodes well for this process. Even NIST acknowledges, however, that the 
technology may be too new for standards development to make sense.109
Despite this early stage, however, active government involvement in 
fostering standards-setting for emerging technology makes good sense. In 
this vein, policy could incentivize vendors to participate in multistakeholder 
standards-setting activities to spur innovation around open standards.110
Second, new forms of proactive disclosure may be necessary to make 
sense of automated decision making. In this respect, contracting agencies 
might take their cue from efforts to promote open science. In 2013, the White 
House issued a directive requiring agencies to develop plans for sharing data 
generated from publicly funded research.111 Supporters believe that requir-
ing data-sharing will foster open science and produce new and innovative 
research.
A similar move could foster openness in automated decision making. 
If procuring entities required the recipients of public funds (whether those 
funds were received through grants or through contracts) to proactively 
share critical information about how their technologies function, it would 
not only create valuable synergies for researchers but also add some much-
needed scientific rigor to an industry that some have accused of selling pure 
“snake oil.”112
Open AI development may raise security and privacy concerns.113 Similar 
criticisms have been lodged against the open-data policy—scientists worry 
about “rigid standards” for data-sharing, and privacy advocates are rightly 
concerned about the privacy of participants in studies such as clinical tri-
als.114 I leave for another day a discussion of the precise contours that might 
or might not be appropriate here.
A third avenue, worth considering, is whether the state itself has a role 
to play, not just in auditing and monitoring automated decision making, but 
also in facilitating public participation. David Engstrom and Daniel Ho have 
recently argued that agencies should engage in “prospective benchmarking,” 
in which they would compare a random sample of decisions generated by 
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AI decision-making tools against the same cases, decided by humans.115 
One concern, naturally, is that agencies convinced that AI provides a more 
efficient and less expensive decision-making system might be disinclined 
to look closely at evidence that might undermine that belief, or to publicize 
negative results. And, at least at the state and local level, it may be unreal-
istic to expect this level of analysis from under-resourced agencies without 
much technical expertise. But prospective benchmarking might provide an 
avenue through which public participation could be broadened and made 
more meaningful; the results of prospective benchmarking, for example, 
might be published and made subject to notice and comment, facilitating 
both public understanding and participation.
Cities and states, too, can do much more to engage the public in ques-
tions about algorithmic decision making. Policies that require public notice 
and comment, or community meetings before acquiring new surveillance 
technologies point to one potential path forward. Cities and states can affir-
matively commit to disclosing information about algorithmic systems in 
current use and soliciting public input each time a new algorithmic decision 
system is adopted. 
One path forward is through the adoption of “AI registers.” AI registers 
are essentially formats for documenting “the decisions and assumptions that 
were made in the process of developing, implementing, managing and ulti-
mately dismantling an algorithm.”116  The cities of Helsinki and Amsterdam 
have both recently begun to roll out AI registers, websites that they use to 
host and make available information about certain kinds of artificial intel-
ligence systems in current use.117 In a similar development, after New York 
City enacted the Public Oversight of Surveillance Technology Act in 2020, 
the New York Police Department began to publish impact and use policies 
on its website for notice and comment for each “surveillance technology” 
in use, although the information is not nearly as detailed, user-friendly, or 
granular as that in the Helsinki or Amsterdam registers.118
These transparency-enhancing practices are, of course, not without cost. 
Indeed, even apparently well-meaning policy interventions have sometimes 
foundered simply because it is too difficult to assemble a full list of every AI 
system in place. Consider the New York City Automated Decision Systems 
Task Force, which was created in 2017 to “come up with recommendations 
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for government use of” automated decision systems, but was stymied when 
the city would not disclose which automated decision systems it was, in fact, 
using.119 Despite the short-term costs, however, the long-term benefits might 
include enhancing buy-in by the public and helping to air potential problems 
with algorithmic systems earlier, rather than later.
Finally, civil society institutions and press outlets can play a meaning-
ful role in ensuring that key information about automated decision making 
reaches the public. In Europe, institutions such as AlgorithmWatch and the 
Ada Lovelace Institute fulfill important watchdog and advocacy functions 
for automated decision systems. In the United States, the closest analogue 
is likely the AI Now Institute, a university-based think tank that performs 
similar roles. Increasingly, specialized press outlets such as The Markup 
and even Consumer Reports are also conducting investigative reporting 
on algorithmic-decision systems and ensuring that vital information finds 
an audience. Ultimately, increasing reliance upon automation means that 
journalists, press institutions, and civil society will need to fight to ensure 
public access to the new methods of governance.
Importantly, these approaches to instantiating algorithmic transparency 
are neither about individual rights nor about technocratic transparency. 
Instead of placing key information about how algorithms work in the hands 
of auditors or agencies that cannot disclose it to the public, these public-ori-
ented protections democratize information and share it widely.
In this sense, the proposals might come under criticism for both doing 
too much and too little. Critics might fear that impediments to secrecy and 
requirements for widespread disclosure would undermine competition by 
discouraging vendors from investing in developing automated decision-mak-
ing tools and thus ultimately stifle innovation. But—as is the case for polic-
ing—many of these vendors market their products primarily or exclusively to 
the government. Companies for whom government agencies are a major cus-
tomer are unlikely to be deterred by more rigorous contracting requirements.
Critics might also (rightly) suggest that information disclosure is not 
enough for real accountability. Average members of the public are unlikely 
to be able to make use of the disclosures I describe above. This “thin” version 
of transparency, then, does not address the same concerns as a right to an 
explanation or thicker accountability mechanisms might. 
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Yet there are two key benefits to investing in information disclosure. 
First, disclosure requirements might create a “market for expertise” that 
ultimately empowers the press and civil society to engage in the kinds of 
newsgathering and rigorous analysis that stimulate public oversight. 120 
Already, specialized nonprofit press outlets such as The Markup, The Appeal, 
and The Marshall Project are developing substantial expertise reporting on 
the instruments of algorithmic governance and their impact on criminal law 
enforcement.121
Second, while transparency is not sufficient to guarantee accountabil-
ity—and does not inevitably lead to accountability—it is a vital precondition 
to accountability-enhancing efforts. As the experience with efforts to reform 
criminal law enforcement  shows, the power to compel government to reveal 
how police use AI is an essential part of a broader reckoning with police 
power and the technology vendors that amplify it.
Information-forcing approaches, then, are an admittedly incomplete 
way of addressing algorithmic accountability. But legal structures that ensure 
that algorithmic governance works for the public, rather than for private 
enrichment, are integral to democracy. The question of how algorithmic 
governance might be made transparent thus raises broader questions both 
about the role of transparency in democratic governance—and about the 
role of democracy in governing algorithms.
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